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Abstract
Multiteam systems (MTSs) are comprised of two or more interconnected teams working toward shared superordinate goals 
but with unique sub-goals. To date, research has predominantly focused on how decisions are made and has viewed these 
cognitive processes as occurring within individuals. However, for MTSs operating in extreme environments such as disasters, 
it is often not a question of how decisions are made, but what is causing delays and failures to make decisions. To understand 
the causes of decision delay within these complex networks, it is important to focus on decision processes at the multiteam 
level. Using naturalistic observational and interview data collected during a multi-site, multiteam emergency response to a 
large-scale disaster exercise, this study examines both information sharing (what was shared, with whom, how long this took), 
and decision processes across teams (situational awareness—SA, plan formulation, and plan execution). Findings demon-
strate that interdependencies in cognitive processes exist across individuals where goals overlap. Decision delay is not only 
caused by failure to develop SA within a team preventing their ability to formulate and execute plans but also by the inability 
of other teams to execute their plans. The implications of these findings for developing targeted interventions are discussed.
Keywords Naturalistic decision making · Situation awareness · Information sharing · Decision delay · Multi-team system
1 Introduction
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) research examines 
how decisions are made in dynamic, real-world contexts 
characterized by time pressure, risk, uncertainty, shifting and 
competing goals, and accountability pressure (Lipshitz et al. 
2001). This often includes extreme environments in which 
lives are at stake, such as military combat (Thunholm 2005), 
firefighting (Klein et al. 1986), counter-terrorism policing 
(van den Heuvel et al. 2012), and disaster response (War-
ing et al. 2018). Findings from this domain highlight the 
importance of access to relevant information for developing 
an accurate understanding of the situation and how it may 
progress to tailor decisions and actions (Rankin et al. 2013). 
For example, during an industrial fire, information about 
building layout and hazardous or explosive chemicals would 
be vital for understanding risks and subsequently deciding 
where to deploy emergency responders, along with the types 
of protective equipment required. Findings also highlight 
that lack of information increases situational uncertainty 
and the probability of making decision errors, with poten-
tially devastating consequences (Lipshitz et al. 2001). For 
example, the gas pump that exploded at Piper Alpha oilrig 
in 1988, killing 167 people, had been sanctioned as unfit for 
use due to a missing safety valve, but this information was 
not shared with the on-duty custodian.
However, it is not only decision errors that can have dev-
astating consequences. So too can decision delay, allowing 
rapidly altering incidents to escalate (van den Heuvel et al. 
2012). Over 30 years’ worth of UK public inquiries into 
disaster response repeatedly highlight the impact of decision 
delays on implementing actions (Pollock 2013), including 
delays of over 2 h in deploying firefighters to the site of the 
Manchester Arena bombing (Kerslake 2018) and evacuating 
residents during the Grenfell Tower fire. Similar problems 
have also been identified internationally, including delays to 
delivering aid after the Boxing Day Tsunami that affected 
14 countries along the coast of the Indian Ocean (Rencoret 
et al. 2010), and slow response and poor prioritization of 
information in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake (Pat-
rick 2011). Yet little research has focused on identifying 
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the mechanisms that underpin decision delay, despite the 
implications for improving disaster response and allowing 
communities to recover in the shortest possible time with 
limited disruption (Manyena et al. 2011).
To date, the small numbers of studies focusing on deci-
sion delay have predominantly been conducted by NDM 
researchers seeking to understand cognitive processes at the 
individual level within single agencies operating in extreme 
environments (van den Heuvel et al. 2013). However, dis-
asters are not managed by individuals working in isolation, 
but by multiteam systems (MTSs) comprised of single-and 
inter-agency teams working toward a shared superordinate 
goal but with unique and interdependent sub-goals at indi-
vidual, team and agency levels (Marks et al. 2005). This 
poses implications for understanding the interplay between 
decision processes across individuals and teams operating in 
extreme environments and how this may contribute toward 
decision delay. In contrast, organizational researchers have 
sought to study inter-team processes within MTSs. But this 
body of work does not specifically focus on decision delay 
and is predominantly conducted with naïve student partici-
pants using laboratory simulations that do not reflect the 
complexity of extreme environments, limiting the develop-
ment of evidence-based interventions (Shuffler et al. 2015). 
Neither NDM nor MTS domains alone are able to explain 
the underlying causes of decision delay within complex mul-
titeam networks that form to respond to extreme environ-
ments such as disasters.
Accordingly, drawing on data from a large-scale disaster 
response exercise, the following study examines decision 
processes at the multiteam level to improve understand-
ing of the underlying causes of decision delay in extreme 
environments. Findings contribute to both NDM and MTS 
theories and highlight a need for these theories to connect to 
improve understanding of complex team structures operating 
in extreme environments.
2  Disaster context
Disasters are large-scale incidents involving mass casual-
ties and major disruptions, including natural and man-made 
disasters and attacks on humans (Home Office 2018). In the 
UK and many other countries internationally, the system that 
forms to respond to disasters is comprised of multiple teams 
from across agencies (e.g. police, fire, ambulance, health, 
local council and other supporting agencies) operating under 
a three-tiered hierarchical command structure (Bharosa et al. 
2010; Civil Contingencies Act 2004; Home Office 2018; 
Majchrzak et al. 2007), with decisions flowing from strategic 
(responsible for setting overall objectives) to tactical (setting 
parameters and level of autonomy for operational command-
ers) and operational commanders (managing the incident 
ground). This MTS is, therefore, characterized by (1) high skill 
differentiation between teams from across agencies, (2) high 
authority differentiation as figures from each agency across 
each command level are responsible for making key decisions, 
and (3) low stability as teams disband once the incident is 
resolved (see Hollenbeck et al. 2012 for a team taxonomy).
As with other MTSs, the agencies involved have an over-
arching shared superordinate goal (save life) at the multiteam 
level and unique sub-goals (for example, collect evidence and 
investigate suspects, extract trapped casualties, treat injuries) 
at agency, team and member levels (LePine et al. 2008). They 
are, therefore, faced with the challenge of coordinating and 
prioritizing the order in which interdependent sub-goals are 
addressed to avoid conflicting actions that would jeopardize 
the superordinate goal (Mathieu et al. 2001). Accordingly, 
exchanging relevant information in a timely manner is integral 
to developing situation awareness (SA) at individual and team 
levels so that appropriate actions for addressing problems are 
identified within teams, but also for ensuring actions are coor-
dinated across teams and agencies (DeChurch and Mesmer-
Magnus 2010; Waring et al. 2018). But as public inquiries 
repeatedly highlight, information sharing within these complex 
networks can be problematic (Hale and Hale 2005; Kerslake 
2018; Pollock 2012).
Part of the issue is that the agencies responding to disasters 
tend to work independent of one another on a day-to-day basis, 
limiting familiarity (Schraagen and Van de Ven 2011). This 
means that during an incident, members may need to learn 
to function across areas of expertise as well as understanding 
how each team contributes to the superordinate goal (Shuffler 
et al. 2015). This creates difficulties for knowing ‘who’ needs 
‘what’ information, ‘when’ and ‘why’ (Kozlowski and Ilgen 
2006). Teams are also often geographically dispersed (e.g. 
operational teams dispersed across a large incident ground, 
command levels-based separately; Schraagen and Van de 
Ven 2011), which can reduce and slow information exchange 
(Maynard et al. 2012). Similarly, differences in knowledge 
and expertise can lead to representational gaps, differences in 
how problems are conceptualized, affecting what information 
is viewed as being relevant to share and pay attention to, and 
how it is interpreted (Cronin and Weingart 2007; Waring et al. 
2018). These information-sharing difficulties are not restricted 
to UK disaster response but have been observed across sev-
eral countries, including the USA (Majchrzak et al. 2007), and 
Netherlands (Bharosa et al. 2010). It is against this challenging 
backdrop that decision processes in MTSs are examined.
3  Decision processes
The field of NDM has produced several models that seek 
to describe how individuals make decisions in challenging 
contexts, most of which share the common assumption that 
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certain stages are undertaken when solving problems (Bales 
and Strodtbeck 1951), including collecting, confirming and 
analyzing information (Cook and Tattersall 2008). One such 
model is the SAFE-T (van den Heuvel et al. 2012), which is 
founded on an extensive evaluation of previous NDM mod-
els (e.g., Lipshitz and Bar-Ilan, 1996; Orasanu et al. 2001; 
Thunholm 2005; Salas et al. 2006), and detailed naturalistic 
observations (Alison et al. 2015). This model proposes four 
sequential phases for effective decision-making in extreme 
environments: situational assessment (SA—analogous to 
situation awareness); plan formulation (F); plan execution 
(E); and team learning (T). SAFE-T has been used to under-
stand how and why various ambient, affective, cognitive 
and organizational factors may derail decision processes at 
individual and team levels. In the absence of a multiteam 
decision model, the current study utilizes SAFE-T to provide 
a framework for examining decision processes at the mul-
titeam level, and how these processes may be linked across 
teams with interconnected goals.
Overall, SA is argued to be the cornerstone for subsequent 
decision processes because the ability to form and execute 
plans that are appropriate for the situation requires a good 
understanding of what is happening and how this might 
develop (Endsley 2000, 2015). Endsley (1988) proposes that 
SA resides in the mind of the individual and is comprised of 
three stages: (1) perception of elements within the environ-
ment, (2) comprehending their meaning, and (3) forecast-
ing their future status. Failure to access relevant and timely 
information leads to inaccurate or outdated understanding of 
what is happening and inability to forecast how this may pro-
gress (Alison et al. 2015; Klein 2008; Lipshitz et al. 2001; 
van den Heuvel et al. 2013). This body of research examines 
the cognitive processes used to develop and maintain SA at 
an individual level (Stanton et al. 2005). However, it does 
not consider how what is happening within an individual’s 
head may stem from, be influenced by, or in turn influence 
interactions with humans, systems or environments (Chat-
zimichailidou et al. 2015; Waring et al. 2018). Accordingly, 
neither the theoretical explanation nor the methodologies 
used is able to capture the complexity of developing and 
acting on SA within MTSs.
Another branch of NDM research has focused on under-
standing how similarities and differences in understanding 
across team members can impact performance (Salas et al. 
2008). Findings highlight that ability to coordinate activities 
is affected by the extent to which each member has access 
to information relevant to developing the SA they need 
to undertake their responsibilities, referred to as team SA 
(TSA; Endsley and Jones 1997). TSA is comprised of the 
sum of individual and shared SA (SSA—common under-
standing of the situation; Salas et al. 2008; Saner et al. 2009). 
In particular, members must have shared knowledge of roles, 
capabilities and interpersonal relationships (Berggren et al. 
2014) to understand the information requirements of others 
and match what they provide to these comprehension needs 
(Bolstad et al. 2002; Endsley 2015; Gorman et al. 2006). But 
the extent to which SA must be shared in order for informa-
tion to be effectively exchanged and activities coordinated 
remains unknown. This is all the more complex in MTSs 
where multiple teams are operating toward a combination of 
both interrelated and unique goals (Chatzimichailidou et al. 
2015). These complex networks may contain an abundance 
of information, not all of which will be needed by everyone 
to undertake their roles. This would make trying to share 
everything with everyone an inefficient strategy, increasing 
cognitive load and task distraction (Stanton et al. 2006).
In contrast, researchers studying cognition within com-
plex networks highlight the value of taking a systems 
approach that sees SA as being distributed (DSA) across 
a network, connecting members to tasks on a ‘moment-
by-moment’ basis (Stanton 2016). In this respect, DSA is 
similar to MTSs in viewing members as having different, 
yet compatible, goals, information requirements and views 
of the situation that may overlap for particular tasks (Nazir 
et al. 2014). DSA extends Endsley’s (1988) model of SA by 
demonstrating that members may be (1) involved in percep-
tion, comprehension and projection of tasks separately, (2) 
with each member operating at different stages of SA at any 
point in time, and (3) that SA may differ between members 
depending on their task (Salmon et al. 2009). According to 
this theory, no individual will have a complete picture of 
everything, making transactions or information exchange 
between members important for maintaining SA across 
the system (Sharma and Nazir 2017; Sorensen and Stanton 
2016).
DSA theory also argues that rather than seeking to share 
all information across the network, it is important that 
the right information is activated and passed to the right 
recipient at the right time (Stanton 2016). This notion is 
founded on transactive memory theory, shared knowledge 
of ‘who knows what’ (Wegner et al. 1985), which views 
different types of knowledge as being distributed across 
members, providing a larger pool of potential informa-
tion. Similar to TSA, both DSA and transactive memory 
also highlight the importance of shared understanding of 
expertise for promoting efficient access to diverse infor-
mation (Ren and Argote 2011; Heavey and Simsek 2015), 
reducing cognitive load (Miller 2008). In contrast to TSA, 
DSA theory views cognitive processes as connected and 
utilizes methods that map information elements and how 
these are shared across complex networks rather than 
comparing SA between individual members (Chatzimi-
chailidou et al. 2015). This approach has been applied in 
a range of contexts such as maritime (Sharma and Nazir 
2017), road design (Walker et al. 2013) and aviation (Grif-
fin et al. 2010), but is not without criticisms. DSA can be a 
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difficult concept to operationalize and measure (Sorensen 
et al. 2011) and, although it considers the connected nature 
of SA across components and the role of information shar-
ing, it has been less focused on measuring the impact on 
subsequent decision processes (Salmon et al. 2008).
3.1  Technologies for supporting information 
sharing in disaster response
Technologies provide an important platform for shar-
ing information during disaster response. For example, 
responders utilize handheld airwave radio devices to pass 
on information about what is happening and requests for 
resources. Different radio channels may be set up to dis-
tinguish the types of information communicated, allowing 
responders to selectively monitor a channel depending on 
their roles and informational needs. Internet-based tech-
nologies are also used to share photographic, video, audio, 
and text-based information across sites, and to visually 
display information, such as maps. In particular, visual 
displays can allow information to be shared efficiently 
without responders needing to search across a busy net-
work, but only if they are rapidly updated as soon as infor-
mation becomes available. This requires that all relevant 
parties are aware of who’s role updating displays is so that 
information can be directed (Militello et al. 2007).
The effectiveness of technologies for supporting 
information sharing is affected by a range of other fac-
tors, including system interoperability between agen-
cies and knowledge of how to use equipment (Waring 
et al., in press). Communication infrastructures can also 
be negatively affected by loss of power and degraded or 
overwhelmed radio airwaves and landlines, satellite, and 
Internet systems (Nelson et al. 2011), as was the case in 
the 9/11 attack (Chan et al. 2004). This has led to focus 
on Hastily Formed Networks (HFNs), portable IP-based 
networks that can be deployed immediately after a disaster 
to create new communication infrastructures for providing 
basic voice, video and data communications (Törnqvist 
et al. 2009). HFNs have been used in disasters such as the 
Haiti earthquake to provide vital assistance with commu-
nications but are also not without limitations, including 
financial cost, availability, coordination difficulties, knowl-
edge of roles, and cognitive effort required to learn to use 
new technologies (Nelson et al. 2011).
Overall, technologies provide a vital platform for allow-
ing information to be shared across geographically dispersed 
disaster response networks. However, their effectiveness is 
largely dependent on how quickly and effortlessly people can 
learn to adapt to technologies, financial cost, and the ability 
of responders to know what information to share, with whom 
and when (Waring et al. 2018).
3.2  Current study
Overall, findings from these different bodies of research 
highlight the importance of access to relevant and timely 
information for developing SA at individual, team and mul-
titeam levels. They also indicate the importance of shared 
understanding of team roles and information requirements 
for promoting effective information sharing. However, 
these types of shared knowledge can be difficult to develop 
in MTSs operating in extreme environments due to limited 
familiarity, geographical distance, and the dynamic nature 
of the environment. Less is known about the impact of 
information sharing on subsequent decision processes, or 
the specific causes of decision delay in MTSs. The follow-
ing study, therefore, aims to contribute to both decision and 
MTS theory by focusing on the role of information sharing 
on decision processes and how these interact across mem-
bers operating within complex MTSs. Understanding the 
causes of decision delay in extreme environments poses 
important implications for developing targeted interventions 
to improve disaster response and recovery.
4  Methods
NDM researchers emphasize the importance of research 
methods with embedded contextual richness for explaining 
real-world decision-making (Burke et al. 2007), arguing for 
the use of field studies to observe and analyze decision pro-
cesses “in vivo” (Dunbar and Blanchette 2001). In line with 
this ethos, naturalistic researchers have often used simulated 
training events to study decision-making. Such events can 
support goals of empirical research as well as organizational 
goals for training the psychological and nontechnical skills 
required to effectively manage extreme environments (Ali-
son et al. 2013; Flin et al. 2008). For this study, data were 
collected during a large-scale multi-agency exercise that 
simulated a chemical terrorist attack. Immersive simulated 
environments of this type provide a useful platform for stud-
ying decision-making in MTSs by providing a vast amount 
of varied data surrounding the social, organizational, cul-
tural, and political factors that are inherent in such extreme 
environments (Waring et al. 2018).
This live exercise was conducted across two geographi-
cally separate locations (a Police Counter Terrorism Unit 
[CTU] and a Military training base), and comprised three 
separate sites: i) a police counter-terrorism (CT) interview-
ing suite (at the Police CTU); ii) a clandestine laboratory; 
and iii) an underground transport network (both located at 
the Military training base). Sites 2 and 3 were approximately 
one mile apart, while site 1 was approximately 150 miles 
away. Thus, teams were geographically dispersed.
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4.1  Exercise scenario
The exercise scenario consisted of a chemical related ter-
rorist attack involving four suspects, three of whom were 
arrested the evening prior to an attack on an underground 
transport network in a metropolitan city. These three sus-
pects (all played by actors) were arrested for terrorism-
related offenses due to posting threatening messages online, 
along with witness reports of overhearing these individuals 
in a public house expressing extremist views and discuss-
ing the planning of a chemical attack using Sarin (a nerve 
agent previously used in attacks on humans). At 8 am on 
the morning of the train attack, the three men were taken 
to the CT interviewing suite (site 1) to be interviewed. At 
approximately 11 am, a specialist search conducted at an 
address linked with one of the suspects revealed a clandes-
tine laboratory in the garage containing dangerous chemicals 
that could be used to make Sarin and explosives (site 2). At 
approximately 12 pm, a train travelling on the underground 
transport network was stopped between two stations (a pur-
pose built 70 m steel surface tunnel, with 140 meters of rail 
track and a 3-carriage train located inside the tunnel) leaving 
more than 70 passengers onboard trapped (site 3), the cause 
of which was unknown to first responders on arrival. A pas-
senger (the fourth suspect) sprayed the first two firefighters 
sent to gather initial information with an unknown chemi-
cal, alerting responders at this site to the hostile nature of 
the incident. Before the exercise could be declared over, the 
fourth suspect needed removing from the train, all evidence 
seized, and all casualties (and first responders exposed to the 
chemical) had to be decontaminated.
In total, the live exercise lasted for 8 h and all three sites 
were linked, such that effective sharing of information across 
locations would allow goals to be achieved more effectively 
(e.g. identifying the contaminant and the strength of the sub-
stance through suspect interviewing at site 1 would assist 
emergency services at site 3 with quickly planning appropri-
ate decontamination procedures). To increase exercise real-
ism, the agencies involved were not informed in advance of 
the existence of three separate sites, nor were they informed 
of the nature of the exercise. Accordingly, they were required 
to identify the links as the exercise progressed, making the 
ability to share information, both within and between agen-
cies across sites, crucial to developing and maintaining accu-
rate shared understanding of the situation and the informa-
tion requirements needed to minimize risk to public safety.
4.2  Participants
Emergency responders from across five different regions in 
the UK took part in the large-scale exercise. At each of the 
three sites, at least one National Inter-agency Liaison Officer 
(NILO) was present from the Fire and Rescue Service (Fire). 
In the UK, the role of NILO was introduced within emer-
gency services as a conduit for bridging intelligence, infor-
mation sharing and advisory gaps across agencies, particu-
larly in response to terrorist incidents where sensitive (i.e., 
restricted) intelligence may need to be shared. These practi-
tioners have undergone specialist training and security clear-
ance to grant them access to such information in an attempt 
to make better-informed decisions about the wider sharing 
of information across agencies within a dynamic incident. 
NILOs at each exercise site served an important role as the 
main conduit through which information was shared across 
locations. All information that responders sanctioned to be 
shared between sites was sent through the NILOs who com-
municated with one another via handheld airwave radios. 
Overall, the exercise involved in excess of 150 members of 
the emergency services. Table 1 contains details of respond-
ers located across sites.
4.3  Data collection and analysis
Twelve members of the research team were distributed 
across the three sites (four at each site). Each researcher 
took detailed observational notes to document what was 
observed and heard. Given the importance of tracking infor-
mation flows between sites, one researcher was assigned 
to each NILO to record the information received, shared 
and requested by each NILO, along with a timestamp. This 
allowed a distinction to be made between what information 
was shared, with whom and how long this took. Similar to a 
DSA approach, this method allowed information sharing to 
be tracked across the network. However, in addition, detailed 
Table 1  Details of emergency responders who participated in the exercise across sites
Site 1 (police CTU) 10 Police interviewers; 2 Ministry of Defense interviewers; 1 Police senior investigating officer (SIO)
Site 2 (clan lab) 1 Police SIO; 1 FRS scientific advisor; 2 FRS Hazardous Materials and Environmental Protection 
Officers (HMEPO); 3 FRS Detection Identification Management (DIM) teams; 1 Ambulance team
Site 3 (underground train) 1 Police operational commander; 1 Police Specialist Hazardous Materials team; 1 Ambulance NILO; 
3 FRS engines manned by teams of four firefighters; 1 FRS Rapid Response Team (RRT) with 
team leader; 1 FRS CBRN subject matter advisor; 1 FRS operational and 1 tactical commander; 
1 FRS command support officer; 2 Ambulance Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART); 1 
Ambulance Specialist Operations Response Team (SORT); 1 Ambulance operational and 1 tactical 
commander
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notes were also taken of decisions and actions subsequently 
implemented and how long these took to implement to cap-
ture the impact on decision processes.
In addition, after the scenario ended, participants were 
interviewed at the clandestine laboratory (n = 1; fire NILO) 
and train site (n = 5; fire NILO, police and ambulance oper-
ational commanders, FRS tactical commander, command 
support officer) using a semi-structured interview protocol 
(employing a Critical Decision Method [CDM] detailed by 
Crandall et al. 2006). This was designed by the researchers 
to gather emergency responder perspectives of SA devel-
opment, information sharing practices and the impact on 
decisions and actions, in line with the aim of this research. 
Interviews lasted between 8 and 28 min (M =10 min) and 
were conducted using prompts to encourage feedback on 
particular topics. However, interview structures were flex-
ible as prompts could be covered in a variety of orders, and 
interviewers could probe on additional topics depending on 
responses. Prompts included: what their role in the incident 
was; a description of what they were faced with upon arrival; 
what information they initially needed and why; what infor-
mation they were unable to access when needed, the impact 
and what they did about this; and strategies used to com-
municate within and between agencies—what worked and 
what did not.
Overall, analysis was conducted in two stages. The first 
stage takes a quantitative approach utilizing observational 
data collected during the incident to identify how much 
information was shared, with whom and how long this took 
across sites. The second stage utilizes qualitative thematic 
analysis, “a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke 2006, p 
79), to identify common themes based on content (Simons 
et al. 2008). Using observational notes and interview tran-
scripts, the aim was to identify facilitators and barriers to 
information sharing and the impact on SA, plan formulation 
and execution. Given the nature of the interviews (short, 
conducted “in the wild” at the end of a simulated chemical 
attack) and interview technique (modified CDM focused on 
information requirements), a mixed-method deductive and 
inductive approach was adopted. The deductive approach 
allowed outcomes of the thematic analysis to be organized 
(e.g. facilitators and barriers across each decision phase), 
and the inductive flexibility allowed important sub-themes 
to emerge rather than being lost during analysis.
5  Analysis
Figure 1 shows a timeline of the scenario and the key deci-
sions that were made. The initial attack on the train site 
occurred at 12.10 pm (real time), after which a team of 
two firefighters went to investigate. These firefighters were 
sprayed with an unknown substance and the response then 
centered on the possibility of a chemical weapon and the 
need to evacuate and de-contaminate civilians. Of particu-
lar importance to this research is the time taken for each of 
these actions to be implemented and the gap between what 
Fig. 1  Timeline of main events
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would be an “ideal” and actual response time (evidence of 
decision delays). For example, while the police and ambu-
lance arrived at the train scene at 12.45 pm and 12.48 pm, 
respectively (35 and 28 min after initial attack), an opera-
tion was not launched until 1.36 pm (51 min) and 1.56 pm 
(1 h and 8 min) after agencies arrived, highlighting delays to 
plan execution. To understand the etiology of delays, analy-
sis is presented in accordance with the SAFE-T model. We 
highlight the role of information sharing within the MTS on 
each individual process (SA, plan formulation, plan execu-
tion) and how issues in a preceding process impacted later 
processes.
5.1  Developing situational awareness within a MTS
Based on the exercise planning documents and discussions 
with the six emergency service subject matter experts who 
designed the scenario, Table 2 shows the total amount of rel-
evant information that could have been extracted across sites 
and the total amount that was extracted. All possible nodes 
of information (or evidence) were sourced at the clandestine 
lab (100%), and only 2 nodes were not extracted at the train 
site (71.43%). Although the greatest number of information 
nodes was extracted at the interview site (56%), 11 nodes 
were not extracted. As the interview team was the only set of 
individuals with access to the three suspects, information not 
extracted through interviews was unavailable to other sites. 
Many of the non-extracted nodes could be considered criti-
cal to the ability of teams at other sites to respond to unfold-
ing events with regard to forming SA of potential threats and 
appropriate methods for managing these.
To support a shared SA, information must not only be 
extracted but also exchanged with the appropriate mem-
bers in a suitably timely manner. Field-based observations 
allowed the flow of information between the three sites and 
the amount of time taken to share this information to be 
tracked. As shown in Table 2, a large quantity of information 
was shared between the three sites (mediated by the NILO 
officers). Of the information extracted (25 nodes), only 1 
node was not shared (4%), suggesting that significant efforts 
were invested in exchanging pertinent information with other 
agencies.
However, as Table 3 shows, in many cases there was a 
significant delay in the sharing of such information. The 
average amount of time it took for information to be shared 
between sites once it had been uncovered was 31.4 min. 
Although there is no “gold standard” for how long each 
node of information should take (and this would also differ 
between each node of information), an average of 30 min 
per node would substantially slow the ability of agencies to 
develop and update their SA and to act accordingly during 
a fast-paced, dynamic, man-made attack where lives are at 
risk. It is important to mention that the decision to share 
information was not solely that of the NILO, they were often 
informed what they were “permitted” to share by command-
ing officers. Delays witnessed were, therefore, the result of 
multiple agents, not just the NILO at each site.
It is also important to note that some delays were site 
specific. Both of the frontline responding sites (clandestine 
laboratory, 18.5 min; train site, 25.5 min) shared informa-
tion much quicker, on average than the CT interviewing site 
(45.5 min). In particular, there was a delay of more than 
40 min in information obtained from the CT interviewing 
site to be shared with the train site regarding what the con-
taminant was and the strength of this, as well as the poten-
tial identity and criminal history of the suspect on the train. 
Such information would be beneficial for informing mass 
decontamination procedures adopted, as well as the level of 
protective equipment and procedures implemented by emer-
gency services to arrest the suspect at this site.
Post-incident interviews with emergency responders 
highlighted a number of facilitators and barriers to informa-
tion sharing within the MTS. In line with previous research, 
facilitators related to developing familiarity with respond-
ers from across agencies, either through training (includ-
ing the National Joint Emergency Services Interoperability 
Programme; JESIP) and managing real incidents. Respond-
ers felt that this improved their ability to understand one 
another by having a shared frame of reference and avoiding 
use of agency-specific terminology. Barriers predominantly 
related to the complexity of the structure responding to the 
incident, including failure to collocate and working in silos, 
in addition to technological issues with radio devices not 
working between teams from different regions (see Table 4 
for details).
Regardless of the cause, all responders interviewed 
noted experiencing delays in accessing information 
needed. For example, the Fire operational commander 
Table 2  Number of units of 
information available identified 
and shared across locations 
and average time taken to share 
identified information






Average time taken 
to share information 
(min)
CTU 25 14 (56%) 10 (71%) 45.5
Clan lab 6 6 (100%) 6 (100%) 18.5
Train site 7 5 (71%) 5 (100%) 25.5
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Table 3  Details of information shared across locations and time taken
Source location Description of information available Information extracted Time to share Shared with
Interview Suite (IS) Names of the three suspects under arrest Provided in brief N/A
What suspects have been arrested for (S41 TACT 
2000, suspicion of being involved in commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism)
Provided in brief N/A
Arrested due to reports of being overheard in a pub 
planning a chemical based terrorist attack on a 
motorway, and for posting extreme material online
Provided in brief N/A
That there is a fourth suspect outstanding Provided in brief N/A
Name and description of fourth suspect—Nathan Fox CT interview 50 min NILO at CL
Details of fourth suspect’s place of work (CrossKeys 
construction)
CT interview Not shared
Details of fourth suspect’s car CT interview U/K NILO at CL
Garage contains sarin nerve agent CT interview 49 min NILO at TS
Fourth suspect, Nathan, has access to Bishop’s 
mother’s garage
CT interview 49 min NILO at TS
Quantity and concentration of sarin liquid CT interview 49 min NILO at TS
Effects of sarin CT interview 49 min NILO at TS
Method of disseminating sarin—5L pressure spray 
pumps
CT interview 49 min NILO at TS
How to treat exposure to sarin—strip clothing and 
atropine sulphate
CT interview 49 min NILO at TS
Bishop owns flat in Peckham and the clan lab address CT interview 20 min NILO at CL
Fourth suspect has learning disabilities—ADHD, 
dyslexia and autism
No
Fourth suspect has a history of violence - PNC No
Details of fourth suspect’s address No
The career of suspect Andrew Bishop—analytical 
chemist
No
That Bishop has experience of making harmful 
chemicals
No
Bishop, Jamie and Nathan have plotted to carry out a 
chemical attack on the underground
No
A fall back ‘go now’ option had been planned by 
Bishop and Nathan to trigger attack if plans dis-
rupted
No
Address of mother’s garage No
Bishop has provided Nathan with a syringe and told 
him it contains an inoculate (atropine sulphate) 
when it actually contains cyanide
No
Bishop has acquired precursors for making HMTD 
and TATP (explosives)
No
Two additional cyanide syringes are in Bishop’s flat No
Clandestine Laboratory (CL) Chemicals to make sarin are in Bishop’s mother’s 
garage
Found in search 0 min NILO at IS
Instructions to make sarin are in garage Found in search 52 min NILO at IS
Method of dispersal of chemical is in garage Found in search 26 min NILO at IS and TS
Precursors for making HMTD and TATP are in 
garage
Found in search 15 min NILO at IS
Materials to make methamphetamine are in garage Found in search 15 min NILO at IS
Effects of exposure to sarin Scientific Advisor 3 min NILO at TS
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needed confirmation about the likely attacker on the train 
and whether he was operating alone to inform his plan. 
The Fire NILO at the clandestine laboratory also needed 
details about this fourth suspect to inform his search 
strategy. He expected the CT interviewing site to receive, 
integrate and re-communicate information across the three 
scenes to consolidate and verify sources. However, the 
CT interviewing site was not quickly passing information 
down to NILOs, causing him to feel that his information 
alone was “dictating” the event.
Trying to remember what I got from CT [interview-
ing], it wasn’t a lot, I got bits and pieces around the 
fourth person, so there could have been a 4th person 
in there. We got a name from them, um, they were 
asking me quite a lot for the addresses, so maybe if I 
had gotten that sooner I could have asked our guys in 
the police to look for that a little sooner as they went 
in, um, so that might have stilted things. I thought 
perhaps at that stage we still might have had to make 
another entry. So maybe that information could have 
come a little bit quicker.
Emergency responders also noted that it was not just a 
question of lack of information affecting their understand-
ing of the situation, but that receiving too much created 
confusion. One police officer referred to this as a ‘vomit 
of information’.
It’s more about the confusion and conflicting reports 
you get at the start of an incident and then as eve-
ryone starts to become acclimatized and get a grip 
that’s when you can start getting that common intel-
ligence picture or situational awareness… It’s as the 
incident evolves and you start getting that clearer 
picture because you lose the conflict and you have 
got conflict.”
5.2  Plan formulation
Problems with developing and updating SA led to several 
points of delay in formulating plans, as identified both 
through naturalistic observation and interviews with emer-
gency responders. A common theme to emerge was the 
impact of uncertainty surrounding who the fourth suspect 
was and specifically if the individual on the train was this 
outstanding fourth suspect that police at the CT interview-
ing site were already aware of (“Nathan Fox”) or if he was 
still unaccounted for. Information that could have helped to 
improve this aspect of SA was available at the CT interview-
ing site, but not all of this was shared, and there were time 
delays to doing so. This caused delays in the ability of the 
police operational commander to formulate a plan because 
not knowing if this was the suspect known to be outstand-
ing (a lone suspect) hindered his assessment of threat levels 
regarding other secondary suspects or devices.
I needed to confirm a lot quicker who the suspect was. 
We were looking for this Nathan Fox, but we could 
not confirm who he was until he had gone through the 
decontamination procedures which had caused a big 
delay because we knew we were looking for a Nathan 
Fox, but we did not know if our man who got arrested 
was Nathan Fox, if it was, happy days, we’ve got eve-
ryone arrested and accounted for, if it wasn’t, we are 
like “who is this guy” and where is Nathan Fox and 
what is he about to do? And are there any secondary 
devices that we need to go and look for?
This uncertainty about who posed a risk to others on the 
train and to emergency services responding to the event, 
created further uncertainty regarding the legislative powers 
available (i.e., what options are legally available to the deci-
sion-maker) and, therefore, the plans that could be developed 
to access and arrest the suspect on the train.
Table 3  (continued)
Source location Description of information available Information extracted Time to share Shared with
Train Station (TS) Incident reported on a tube by a station manager—
three tubes stuck in a tunnel in the Jubilee line 
between Southwark and London Bridge. Evacua-
tion of tube 1 and 3 is possible but tube 2 is not at 
platform level
Incident on train 10 min NILO at CL
51 min NILO at IS
Two firefighters sprayed by suspect on tube with an 
unknown contaminant
Reported from train 20 min NILO at CL
45 min NILO at IS
60-75 casualties on board tube two Reported from train U/K NILO at CL
Suspect arrested Reported from train 27 min NILO at IS
Means of dispersal found—5L spray canisters Reported from train 0 min NILO at CL
Cyanide syringe found on train No
Identification of chemical used on train as sarin by 
DIM team
No
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That is going to affect my decision-making. Um, for 
me, I needed to identify who was involved, what their 
capability was in terms of, um, causing harm to others, 
and then from there, also their sort of intent. Sort of 
what they are going to do with that. So, they were my 
main key things. I needed to find out who my victims 
were, who my suspect was, the location of where any-
thing was going on. And then from that, I could inform 
what I would call a threat assessment, so I would iden-
tify where my risks… So once I’ve identified who is 
at risk of this that and the others, the information that 
I have got will also help me decide what powers and 
policies as a Police Officer I can implement considera-
tions around human rights, um, levels of force we can 
use, the level of equipment we can get officers to dress 
up in. All of that kind of stuff, and then from there I 
can start looking at options, to decide well to do all of 
that what do I need to do.
5.3  Plan execution
Lack of information regarding who the suspect was not only 
limited the ability of police to develop SA and formulate 
plans but also affected the ability of Fire and Ambulance ser-
vices to execute the plans that they had already formulated. 
Fire and Ambulance teams were unable to enter the train to 
rescue, treat and decontaminate casualties until over 90 min 
after arriving on scene. Throughout this period, passengers 
remained trapped with the suspect and an unknown contami-
nant, and there was no form of communication with emer-
gency services. This delay in Fire and Ambulance teams 
executing plans to rescue and decontaminate passengers 
was not the result of either team being unable to develop or 
formulate plans, but rather delays in Police forming plans 
to arrest the suspect. Fire and Ambulance were dependent 
upon Police to achieve their goal of arresting the suspect first 
before their own responders could enter the train and imple-
ment actions to achieve casualty rescue and treatment goals.
So we have turned up on the scene, we have requested 
the police. We are waiting for the police. We have got 
casualties there, our role as firefighters, we are ready 
but unfortunately we cannot put ourselves in risk to 
save that life initially while there is an assailant run-
ning through spraying people. We could not…
Because that perpetrator was physically attacking and 
making a scene unsafe, taking him out, neutralizing 
that threat was key because then that released us to 
undertake… I think that there was initial confusion 
around deployment at the beginning, there was a bit of 
a time lag there. Then there was the Decon time lag. 
There was some difficulty, um, because of the perpe-
trator.
Delays in sharing time-sensitive information (mainly 
obtained through suspect interviews), therefore, created 
delayed actions in dealing with the man-made threat on 
the train, posing potential risks to the lives of passengers 
exposed to the sarin gas. Once Police arrested the suspect, 
it took less than 30 min for all remaining passengers to be 
removed from carriages and to undergo mass decontamina-
tion. Figure 2 provides a flowchart to summarize the factors 
that contributed towards decision delay.
6  Discussion
Previous research demonstrates difficulties with information 
sharing in MTSs, particularly those comprised of members 
from different agencies (Kozlowski and Ilgen 2006; Shuffler 
et al. 2015), who are geographically dispersed (Maynard 
et al. 2012). Findings from the current study add to this liter-
ature by highlighting the impact of these difficulties on deci-
sion processes at the multiteam level. They also add to the 
limited psychological literature on decision delay (Alison 
et al. 2015). Whilst errors in selecting appropriate options 
have received a great deal of focus in previous research, it 
was decision and action delay that was problematic within 
the MTS observed in the current study. Findings demon-
strate the role that information sharing and interconnected 
goals plays in mitigating and amplifying the conditions that 
lead to decision delay in MTS members. Decision delay 
resulted from both individual cognitive processes in terms of 
inability to develop SA and formulate plans, and interactions 
across MTS members. As will be discussed below, findings 
pose implications for developing targeted interventions to 
improve information sharing and decision-making in MTSs 
operating in extreme environments.
6.1  Information sharing and situation awareness
NDM research highlights the importance of access to rel-
evant information for developing an accurate understand-
ing of what is happening and how this might progress 
(Endsley 2000, 2015) to tailor decisions and actions to 
the situation (Rankin et al. 2013). Within MTSs operating 
in extreme environments, information sharing and inter-
pretation is not only vital to developing accurate SA at 
individual (Endsley 2000) and team levels (Wright et al. 
2004), but also the multiteam level to coordinate sub-
goals and actions, and implemented them in an appropri-
ate order (Davison et al. 2012). Previous NDM research 
has focused on the impact of information sharing and poor 
SA on decision processes at an individual level, but not 
the multiteam level. MTS research has focused on inter-
team processes but does not specifically focus on decision 
delay, and is often conducted with naïve participants in 
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laboratory-based contexts that do not reflect the complex-
ity of extreme environments. This limits understanding 
of the causes of decision delay within complex networks 
operating in complex environments, and the development 
of evidence-based interventions. Accordingly, the current 
study adopted a data collection framework that drew on a 
range of methods to examine communication and decision-
making behaviors in situ. In line with a DSA approach 
(Chatzimichailidou et al. 2015), we tracked what informa-
tion was shared, with whom, and how long this took. In 
line with an NDM approach (Crandall et al. 2006; Burke 
et al. 2007), observational and interview methods were 
used to understand the impact of information sharing on 
SA, plan formulation and execution phases across the MTS 
operating in an extreme environment.
Analysis identified many instances in which information 
sharing was delayed, subsequently resulting in deferred 
action across the MTS. In particular, delays in informa-
tion from the CT interviewing site being shared resulted in 
over an hour of delays in action on the incident ground with 
regard to arresting the suspect on the train and rescuing and 
decontaminating casualties. To put this point into perspec-
tive, if the concentration of sarin is high enough, paralysis 
(and death) can occur within 10 min. Despite the significant 
time pressure for Fire and Ambulance teams to enter the 
train carriage and deal with casualties, actions were signifi-
cantly delayed by the amount of time taken for information 
available at a different geographical location to be shared 
with Police on the incident ground.
Although previous research demonstrates that being geo-
graphically dispersed can delay information sharing (Martin 
and Bal 2006; Maynard et al. 2012), current findings suggest 
this may not be the only contributing factor. All three sites 
were geographically dispersed, requiring use of handheld 
radios to communicate. However, the responding sites (tacti-
cal and operational located at the clandestine laboratory and 
train sites) were much quicker to share information with one 
another in comparison to the CT interviewing site. Many of 
the emergency responders located at the clandestine labo-
ratory and train site had received training and had previ-
ously managed smaller scale incidents that required them to 
operate with other agencies on the front line of an incident. 
Accordingly, they were more familiar with one another’s 
practices than with investigative procedures, and similarly, 
officers located at the CT interviewing site would be less 
familiar with frontline emergency response procedures. 
This is in line with TSA (Berggren et al. 2014; Bolstad 
et al. 2002; Gorman et al. 2006), DSA (Stanton et al. 2006; 
Stanton 2016) and transactive memory (Wegner et al. 1985) 
research, which show the importance of shared familiarity 
with roles and responsibilities for promoting a better under-
standing of informational needs and quicker exchange of 
relevant information (Waring et al. 2018).
These findings also parallel research from within the 
engineering domain, which highlights the negative impact 
that dissonance arising from conflicts in individual and col-
lective knowledge can have on risk assessment (Vanderhae-
gen and Carsten 2017). Vanderhaegen (2017) notes the vital 
importance of attending to dissonance, assessing the prob-
ability of its occurrence and analyzing the consequences to 
design processes and systems to minimize this. Similarly, 
organizational researchers note the impact of differences 
in knowledge across domain expertise for conceptualizing 
problems, and sharing and attending to information (Cronin 
and Weingart 2007). Current findings indicate that greater 
familiarity with one another’s roles and responsibilities 
among frontline emergency responders helped to reduce 
conflicts in understanding the situation, promoting quicker 
exchange of information. Taken together, these findings sug-
gest that dissonance and representational gaps may contrib-
ute to decision delay by hindering the effectiveness of infor-
mation sharing and subsequent SA development. However, 
future research is required to test these associations using 
methods that specifically measuring dissonance (Vanderhae-
gen 2017) and representational gaps (Cronin and Weingart 
2007), alongside the data collection framework used in this 
study to identify decision delay.
Drawing on observations of behaviors in situ, the current 
study was also able to identify the etiology of barriers to SA 
and their ensuing effects on the timely formation and execu-
tion of plans. NDM models highlight that uncertainty about 
the situation often prevents the decision maker being able to 
prospectively (or at least accurately) project the outcomes of 
a given decision (Lipshitz and Strauss 1997). Current find-
ings identify that uncertainty surrounding the situation and 
the outcomes of an action do indeed delay decisions and 
actions, but are not the only sources of uncertainty to do 
so (van den Heuvel et al. 2013). By focusing on decision 
and communication processes in situ at the multiteam level, 
additional sources of uncertainty that hampered effective 
SA and delayed action were identified, including inability 
to establish communications on the incident ground due to 
problems with incompatible radios across teams from dif-
ferent regions, and a tendency for teams to work in silos. 
First, this reinforces the need for investment in communica-
tion devices that operate across agencies and regions; an 
issue pertinent to UK emergency services as they currently 
undergo processes to alter software through which radio 
devices operate due to logistical issues. Second, it high-
lights that although working in silos can improve communi-
cation within teams this comes at a cost to communication 
between teams, which is problematic in MTSs where goals 
and actions need to be coordinated.
Further research is needed to understand the best struc-
ture for reducing the cognitive demands of engaging in 
activities to simultaneously source, process and exchange 
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information within and between agencies in extreme envi-
ronments. For example, growing evidence highlights that 
decentralized rather than centralized structures may be better 
for improving access to relevant, timely information during 
disaster response, promoting DSA (Schraagen and Van de 
Ven 2011; Waring et al. 2018). However, the development 
and use of robust frameworks for evaluating behaviors in situ 
within extreme contexts, and application of these standard-
ized data frameworks across a range of MTS contexts will 
be important for testing the conditions under which decen-
tralized structures outperform centralized in improving 
information sharing, coordination and decision making. For 
example, to test whether the number of component teams, 
number of members within each team, number of different 
Fig. 2  A flow chart to show the 
role of information sharing and 
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agencies involved, level of interconnectedness between sub-
goals, variety of tasks that need completing, dynamicity of 
the situation or other factors affect whether centralized or 
decentralized structures improve the ability to share relevant 
information in a timely manner with those who need it, and 
whether this reduces decision delay.
6.2  Impact across decision processes
Findings demonstrate the interconnected nature of decision 
processes across individuals operating within a complex 
MTS. Research that focuses on SA at the individual level 
indicates that “inaction” is an emergent outcome of poor SA 
as individuals struggle to identify and implement courses 
of action in the face of uncertainty (Alison et al. 2015; van 
den Heuvel et al. 2013). Focusing on these processes at a 
multiteam level in situ identified several underlying causes 
of decision delay. Firstly, lack of information sharing across 
geographically dispersed locations (largely stemming from 
delays in the CT interviewing site sharing and integrat-
ing information) created uncertainty at the responding 
level, meaning that some teams were unable to effectively 
develop plans because they were unsure about the nature of 
the chemical, identity or location of the “fourth suspect”. 
Hence, poor SA delayed the ability to effectively make and 
subsequently implement plans.
However, the multi-agency nature of this operation high-
lighted that delays to executing plans were not only influ-
enced by the ability of the individual to develop SA but 
were also influenced by the cognitive processes of others. 
For example, whilst the Fire tactical commander had estab-
lished a plan to evacuate casualties, his ability to implement 
this plan was postponed due to delays in Police being able 
to execute their sub-goal of arresting the suspect. In con-
trast to research that focuses on cognitive processes at the 
individual level, observations of behaviors in situ within a 
MTS operating in an extreme environment provide evidence 
that goal interdependencies can contribute to decision delay. 
Where goal interdependencies exist, failure for one team 
to develop appropriate SA to inform the development of 
plans to address their goals can impact the ability of other 
teams to implement actions to address theirs, even where 
they have developed appropriate SA to form their own plans. 
We observed first-hand the detrimental impact of delays in 
information sharing on multiple teams where sub-goals are 
connected.
Although these findings are based on analysis of one dis-
aster response exercise conducted with a UK sample, they 
parallel behaviors observed in real incidents, both in the UK 
(Pollock 2013) and internationally (Patrick 2011; Rencoret 
et al. 2010). However, further research is needed to identify 
the extent to which these same patterns are observed across 
MTSs operating in other types of extreme context, including 
medical emergencies (Mathieu et al. 2001) and military con-
texts (DeConstanza et al. 2014). Similarly, studies adopting 
similar methods are also needed across different countries 
and cultures to test whether the same factors contribute 
to and result in decision delay during multiagency disas-
ter response internationally. This is important for improv-
ing understanding of the conditions under which decision 
delay is likely to occur and why, along with identifying what 
works in practice to reduce decision delay.
6.3  Practical implications
At a practical level, findings highlight a need for agencies 
to focus on developing a shared understanding of the roles, 
goals and information available to other agencies, in line 
with organizational research on TMSs (Heavey and Sim-
sek 2015; Ren and Argote 2011). Such knowledge may help 
agencies to proactively request information from the appro-
priate sources quicker. Similarly, findings also highlight the 
importance of understanding the types of information that 
other agencies need during complex operations of this type, 
in line with NDM research into SSA (Endsley 2015; Gorman 
et al. 2006). Whilst national Home Office funded JESIP has 
been beneficial for ensuring that agencies utilize a common 
language to communicate and are focused on developing 
a shared appreciation of the situation and risks involved, 
much of this work has been directed to front line emergency 
responders. Findings of this study highlight the importance 
of ensuring that all law enforcement and emergency service 
practitioners, even those who traditionally serve an inves-
tigative role, are aware of the roles, responsibilities and 
requirements of responders managing an incident on the 
ground to facilitate the timely sharing of relevant informa-
tion obtained through investigative actions.
Findings also highlight that developing interventions to 
address issues with decision delay for agencies who operate 
in MTS contexts where goal interdependencies may exist 
should not only focus on decision processes at the individual 
level. Given that decision delay is not only caused by indi-
vidual cognitive processes but also interactions between 
cognitive processes of multiple individuals and teams, it is 
important that interventions focus on encouraging consid-
eration of the interconnectedness of goals and decisions, 
and of how this may impact on a situation, and developing 
shared frames of reference for viewing problems and goals 
to reduce dissonance and representational gaps. Whilst tech-
nologies continue to be developed that allow information to 
be communicated across locations in a variety of formats 
(audio, visual, text), these technologies will not automati-
cally improve the speed and accuracy of information sharing 
to aid decision making in the absence of interventions that 
address issues with understanding roles, goals and types of 
information available across agencies within a MTS.
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Overall, recommendations are relevant for other MTSs 
operating in extreme environments characterized by high 
risk and uncertainty. They highlight the importance of ensur-
ing that any interventions implemented to improve infor-
mation sharing and coordination across teams are not just 
delivered to employees working ‘on the ground’ but to all 
components who may be party to information of relevance 
to informing decisions and actions taken at this level. Fur-
ther work is required to understand what form such training 
should take to best promote the effectiveness of informa-
tion sharing within and between agencies, and how often 
such training should be delivered to maintain these com-
plex skills. Further work is also required to identify ways of 
designing communication technologies to assist in prompt-
ing the sharing of relevant information across complex 
networks.
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